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Crisis Management in High Reliability Organizations: Lessons from 




Purpose: The focus of this study was to analyze crisis management in a context of High-
Reliability Organizations (HRO) evidenced in two cases of Brazilian air disasters. Aspects of 
human and technological natures were examined, addressing the complex socio-technical 
system. 
Methodology: This in-depth case study addressed the two most serious air disasters on 
Brazilian territory. The first case involved a mid-air collision between Gol Flight 1907 and the 
Legacy jet. In the second case, TAM flight 3054 had difficulty braking when landing at the 
airport and crashed into a building. Data were collected from official disaster documents. 
Findings: The results revealed that the management and operational activities aimed to 
maintain the necessary conditions that prioritize a high level of reliability. High reliability 
mainly involves concern over failure, reluctance to accept simplified interpretations, sensitivity 
to operations, commitment to resilience and detailed structure specifications.  
Practical Implications: The implications are based on alerting highly reliable organizations, 
emphasizing the focus on managing more reliably, resiliently and conscientiously. Changes will 
be required in the operations of organizations seeking to learn to manage unexpected events 
and respond quickly to continually improve the responsiveness of their services. 
Originality: In the perspective of an intrinsic case study for crisis management in a context of 
HRO and disaster risk management, the originality of this study lies in its examination of the 
paradoxical nature of control within the systems of dangerous operations in complex 
organizations, as well as their contradictions in a high-reliability system. 
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In environments such as airlines, hydroelectric or thermonuclear plants, disasters can result in 
an unforeseen sequence of random events and cause great catastrophes. Disaster risk derives 
from the magnitude, potential occurrence, frequency, speed and spatial extent of a harmful 
event or process, plus people´s susceptibility to loss, injury or death (Wisner et al., 2012). 
Diversity of agents in permanent interaction can cause failure, and their behavior depends on 
human and technical conditions or the state of the parties. This means that the performance of 
these systems is often unpredictable (Allen, Maguire and Mckelvey, 2011, Ladyman et al., 
2013). 
Organizations, such as airlines, are always subject to the risks inherent to their activities 
and they strive to learn from failures and ensure that errors are not repeated in future events. 
Therefore, these organizations are considered complex systems – open and adaptive systems 
with a large number of elements, nonlinearity, unpredictability, and diversity of agents, whose 
behavior is determined by the nature of their interactions (Cilliers, 1998) – founded on the 
principles of high reliability, which are constantly challenging their management (Gherardi, 
1998; Catino and Patriotta, 2013; Antonacopoulou and Sheaffer, 2014). These are High 
Reliability Organizations (HROs), in which processes are tightly coupled to ensure reliability. 
In this paper, crisis management refers to managerial practices related to non-routine 
phenomena including critical decision making as well as activities linked to prevention, 
preparation and mitigation, seeking organizational recovery and change (Comfort, 1988). 
Furthermore, it is analyzed in the context of High Reliability Organizations as evidenced in two 
cases of Brazilian flight disasters. Aspects of human and technological natures, addressing the 
complex socio-technical system, were examined, providing important lessons for airlines and 
traffic control systems. These factors contributed to the occurrence of both disasters. The 
implications of these are relevant when it comes to managing crisis situations and HRO, 
especially those whose performance essentially depends on the reliability of these systems. 
Two internationally notorious flight disasters occurred on Brazilian territory, causing 
considerable social repercussions with hundreds of deaths. The first case occurred in September 
2006, involving the Boeing 737-800 and the Legacy 600. The airplanes collided in midair in 
the northwest of the country. The second disaster, which also had serious repercussions 
nationwide, occurred in July 2007, involving a TAM Airbus A320, Flight 3054 at Congonhas 
airport in São Paulo, surrounded by a densely populated area. Founded in 1936, it is considered 
the executive airport of Brazil due to the large number of its business travelers. In 2018, 600 
aircraft landed and took off there every day, approximately 36 per hour. 21,637,662 passengers 
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passed through the airport in 2018. When the disaster occurred, the plane underwent braking 
difficulties and skidded off the runway, crashing into a building located on the other side of the 
avenue next to the airport. 
The main contribution of this study lies in the in-depth crisis management analysis of 
air disasters through the lens of the Normal Accident Theory (NAT) and High Reliability 
Organizations (HRO), exploring the lessons and implications of socio-technical system failures. 
In addition, the paradoxical nature of control within the systems of dangerous operations was 
examined, as well as their contradictions in a system of high reliability. The civil aviation 
system operates under tightly regulated rules and regulations, but continually makes room for 
technical failures, misconduct, neglected errors, and mistakes by humans or systems that 
become the source of disasters, making this system an extremely vulnerable one. 
 
2. Theoretical Foundation 
2.1 High Reliability and Normal Accidents 
The air navigation system operates with risks that are not always explicit but are directly 
interlinked with their complexity. Complexity science provides relevant theoretical support for 
conducting systematic studies of complex systems, examining the circumstances in which 
phenomena of emergency and complexity occur (Abrahamsson, Hassel, and Tehler, 2010; 
Allen, Maguire and McKelvey, 2011). Normal Accident theory (NAT) and High-Reliability 
Theory (HRT) focus on the study of the causes of disasters in hazardous operations in complex 
systems (Areosa, 2012). 
Systems with interactive complexity and tight coupling are subjected to unforeseen or 
unexpected accidents called “systems accidents” or “normal accidents” (Perrow, 1999). A tight 
coupling system is understood as a highly interdependent one, where each part of the system is 
closely linked to the other parts. As a result, any change in one part can impact the conditions 
of the other parts of the system (Marais, Dulac and Levenson, 2004), which makes the system 
more responsive to challenges because each part is less capable of responding in its own way 
(Orton and Weick, 1990). 
On the other hand, loosely coupled systems have few variables in common or fewer 
tight links among themselves. Thus, such systems are able to absorb failures or unplanned 
behavior without losing stability (Marais, Dulac and Levenson, 2004). Consequently, being less 
responsive to challenges, they display more distinctiveness (Orton and Weick, 1990).  What 
NAT does is explain what happens in a system when unintentional behavior causes a series of 
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events that configure an accident (Perrow, 1999). Both theories help complex organizations 
build reliable systems by adapting and responding to unforeseen events. 
In Normal Accident Theory (Weick, 2004), prevention could not be 100% efficient in a 
system of complex interactions, given that interactions are unclear, unexpected or even 
unpredictable. Likewise, a tightly coupled system would be capable of transforming the 
magnitude of an event into something catastrophic and impossible to contain once it had begun, 
as the response time would be minimal. Disasters are considered normal events in some 
complex interactive environments and, particularly, in high coupling systems (Shrivastava, 
Sonpar and Pazzaglia, 2009). This observation led to questions regarding how these 
organizations, which use complex high-risk technology, manage to operate for long periods 
without accidents. 
High-Reliability Theory seeks to answer this question by focusing on four aspects by 
managing performance, culture of responsibility, organizational learning and redundancy in a 
variety of aspects of activities of complex organizations (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2006). 
Organizations with lower rates of accidents are those that maintain risk awareness focused on 
reliability in operations and manage to maintain high levels of control in environments where 
there are no second chances (Roberts et al., 1994; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2007). 
In this respect, while NAT is sustained more by structural and political dimensions, 
HRO is supported by a technical and behavioral aspect of complex systems (Sagan, 1993), 
although both theories are quite compatible (Rijpma, 2003; Areosa, 2012). While proponents 
of NAT do not preclude redundancy in high-risk systems, the proponents of HRO do not stress 
that complex organizations are free of failures. Disaster risk management practice is still very 
much dominated by reaction and response, to the detriment of development-based risk 
reduction and avoidance interventions (Oliver-Smith et al., 2016). 
 
2.2 Crisis Management, Failure and Learning in HRO 
Crises are typical features of today’s society. Crisis management is the process through which 
organizations cope with unexpected or disruptive events that threaten their functioning, prestige 
and image (Catino, 2008). Failure and learning in complex systems pose a challenge to 
management due to the organizational characteristics and hazardous operations within this kind 
of system. In this context, learning is essential not only to understand disasters and errors but 
also for determining corrective processes founded on procedures and the culture of reliability 
(Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002). Through the learning processes that a complex system 
undergoes, it is possible to assume a more proactive HRO based approach. 
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Furthermore, the process of analyzing disasters allows a rapid identification of failures 
that might be implicitly unknown to the organization and could lead to near misses or even 
latent errors (Pidgeon and O’Leary, 2000). Individuals together with technological and 
instrumental apparatuses are decisive when disasters occur. Thus, complexity theories like NAT 
and HRO have distinct but inter-related perspectives in their scope, allowing a better 
understanding of the nature of the events and what can be learned from failures and errors. 
Monitoring technical factors is clearly important to maintain high-reliability, but those 
interested in keeping control cannot think only in terms of technical control. They also have to 
be concerned with managerial controls (Turner, 1994). 
Human errors in organizations are identified at two levels: personal and system 
approach. The personal approach concentrates on unsafe acts like errors and procedural 
violations by human beings. This behavior is the result of a lack of attention, negligence and 
recklessness. The system approach, on the other hand, is built on the premise that humans are 
fallible and that errors are made even in the best organizations (Reason, 2000). Therefore, errors 
are perceived more as a consequence than a cause and are less concentrated on the perversity 
of human nature and more on “upstream systemic factors” (Reason, 2000: 768). Wisner, 
Gaillard and Kelman (2012) indicated that disaster risk can be analyzed from different 
perspectives, distinct actors and contexts. 
 
3. Method 
This qualitative case study (Creswell and Poth, 2017) aimed to examine crisis management in 
the context of high-reliability organizations evidenced in two cases of flight disasters in Brazil. 
These flight disasters were intentionally selected because of their international repercussion and 
impact on the Brazilian community, which has an average of one flight accident every two days 
(FOLHA DE SÃO PAULO, 2018). This is a perspective of an intrinsic case study in which 
each case involves a unique or unusual situation (Stake, 1994). Data were gathered in the form 
of official documents related to the Flight Disasters. The data analysis and interpretation process 
are shown in Figure 1. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Following the description, the data analyses were segmented by specific themes, 
aggregating information into large clusters of ideas and providing details that support the 
themes. Stake (1994: 123) calls this analysis the “development of issues”. In the Cross-Case 
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process, similarities and differences between the two cases were described and analyzed. This 
involved examining themes across cases to discern those that are common and different to all 
cases (Creswell and Poth, 2017). 
To analyze the cases, the socio-technical aspects were observed, as well as the temporal 
sequence of the events leading up to the crashes. A socio-technical disaster is considered a man-
made disaster and an industrial crisis in which the community is involved (Shaluf, Ahmadun 
and Said, 2003). An industrial disaster is known as a crisis-related phenomenon and may 
develop into a crisis; it is then called an industrial crisis, an industrial crisis that results from 
socio-technical disasters (Quarantelli, 1988). Crises may develop because of political and 
economic issues, as well as from disasters, as demonstrated in Figure 2. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Case studies often end with conclusions formed by the researcher regarding the overall 
meaning derived from the cases. These are called “assertions” by Stake (1994), with the 
researcher providing an interpretation of the data couched in terms of personal views or in terms 
of constructs in the literature. These can be considered general lessons learned from studying 
the cases (Creswell and Poth, 2017).  
The Brazilian Aviation System is made up of public organizations such as ANAC 
(National Agency for Civil Aviation), which is in charge of setting policies, rules and 
regulations plus supervision of the civil aviation system in the country, and CENIPA (Center 
for Investigation and Prevention of Aviation Accidents). This is a federal agency in charge of 
analyzing investigations, developing reports and policies seeking the high-reliability of the 
system. Another federal organization is Infraero, which is in charge of administering the whole 
system of airports in the country. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
3.1 Cases 
In this study, two cases are contrasted in an attempt to identify both regularities and differences. 
The cases belong to the same domain and occurred in the same geographical context, thus 
making comparisons possible. Two case studies were analyzed, one involving Gol Flight 1907 
and the Legacy jet, and the other being TAM Flight 3054, which will be referred to as Case 1 




[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
 Case 1 
The case 1 occurred on 29 September 2006, when Gol Flight 1907 left Manaus, Brazil, 
in the state of Amazonas, in the northwest of the country, for Rio de Janeiro with 148 passengers 
and six crew on board, with a planned stopover in Brasília, Federal District. Meanwhile, the 
Legacy jet took off from São José dos Campos in São Paulo State, Brazil, for Fort Lauderdale 
in the USA (ANAC, 2008). The Legacy jet was manufactured by the Brazilian company 
Embraer and sold to Excelaire, an American air taxi company. This company sent two 
experienced pilots to Brazil for the flight to the United States. During the days preceding take 
off, both pilots familiarized themselves with the technical functions of the aircraft, including 
the accident prevention system, TCAS. Following a thorough recognition of the aircraft, the 
Legacy initiated the take-off procedure and followed its route. Meanwhile, Gol Flight 1907 was 
on a routine journey with its crew, in compliance with the technical regulations required for 
take-off procedure, and followed its normal route (ANAC, 2008; CENIPA, 2008; Sant’Anna, 
2011). 
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
Case 2 
The case 2 occurred on 17 July 2007, when TAM Flight 3054, with 181 passengers and 
6 crew on board, was travelling from Porto Alegre in Rio Grande do Sul State to São Paulo, 
Brazil. It was a routine flight. The airplane rose to the correct altitude and remained at cruise 
speed for forty minutes before beginning its landing procedure. At 18:43, the pilots began 
reviewing the checklist for landing and touched down soon afterwards. However, the plane had 
difficulty in braking, veered to the left, skidded off the runway and crashed into a building on 
the other side of the airport avenue (ANAC, 2009; CENIPA, 2009; Sant’Anna, 2011). After the 
disaster, ANAC determined that only pilots with over 100 hours of flight experience and who 
have practiced go-arounds after the landing gear has touched down may land or take off with 
Boeing and Airbus at Congonhas airport (ANAC, 2009; CENIPA, 2009). A new control tower 
was opened at the airport in 2013, and the main runway was reformed again to prevent the 





4.1 Crisis from Human Errors 
Case 1 - The Legacy jet, at the time of the disaster, was not at the correct altitude, which should 
have been achieved after flying 480 km to the northeast of Brasília. There was no warning from 
the control system and the technical report shows that the controller responsible for paying 
attention to the altitude of the Legacy was concentrating on a Brazilian Air Force flight for 
which he was also responsible. This flight was on a mission to gather radar images near Brasília. 
As a result, the controller did not notice that the signal from the Legacy flight had “vanished” 
from the radar and was not sending accurate data. This failure continued without due attention 
following the change of shift when the next controller took over from his colleague (ANAC, 
2008; CENIPA, 2008; Sant’Anna, 2011). 
The standard time for reporting a change in route should not be long, considering the 
possibility of a crash. Even so, during the flight, there was no communication between the two 
control towers and the jet. In the reports, the flight controllers’ poor mastery of the English 
language was observed, and there was little or no understanding of the information given by 
the crew of the Legacy. At that time, it would have been possible to share information on the 
correction of the route, speed or traffic that would be important to the operation of the aircraft. 
This was not done by either party. Effective communication between the controllers and the 
controllers and the aircraft, would have mitigated the risk of an accident (ANAC, 2008; 
CENIPA, 2008; Sant’Anna, 2011). 
 
Case 2 - At the time of the disaster, the levers were not correctly positioned for the landing 
maneuver. Therefore, when it touched down, the plane did not have sufficient braking action to 
complete the process. Before reaching the end of the runway, the pilot shifted the lever to the 
left and swerved onto the grass before crashing into the building (ANAC, 2009; CENIPA, 
2009). In São Paulo, the conditions of the runway at Congonhas airport were not entirely 
favorable for landing at that time as it was a stormy day. The main complaint registered was 
related to the grooving system. This should have been sufficient justification for the closure of 
the airport, but the complaint was not given due attention. The Center for the Investigation and 
Prevention of Aeronautic Accidents (CENIPA) drafted a report that pointed out the main causes 
of the disaster. These included the wrong position of the levers prior to landing and the fault of 
the Brazilian Airport Infrastructure Company (Infraero) regarding the recommendation to close 





4.2 Crises due to Technical Failures 
Case 1 - Two technical faults were directly involved in the disaster. First, the lack of technical 
knowledge of the Legacy jet meant that the pilots had to undergo intensive training with regard 
to its main functions before departure. Despite the pilots’ lack of knowledge of the aircraft, the 
plane took off and remained at the programmed altitude until it drew near to Brasília, when the 
pilots were instructed, through information received from the control tower in Brasília, to shift 
from an altitude of eight thousand feet to thirty-eight thousand feet between Brasília and 
Manaus. To report the altitude error, the transponder on the aircraft should have transmitted 
signals to the tower, which was responsible for advising both aircraft of the corrective 
maneuver. However, after passing through Brasília, the transponder of the Legacy was switched 
off by the pilots. This was the second decisive event leading up to the disaster because with the 
transponder turned off the anti-collision system was not working. This led to the planes crashing 
in midair (ANAC, 2008; CENIPA, 2008; Sant’Anna, 2011). 
 
Case 2 - The inadequate positioning of the levers during the braking of the aircraft in the landing 
process was the main factor in the incomplete procedure. The left-hand lever was in the IDLE 
position, activating the reverser of the left engine, while the right thrust lever was in a position 
with 80% power. Due to the bad procedure, the flight computer understood that the plane was 
executing a go-around and did not reduce speed correctly. Later investigations found that the 
plane had had a defect in the thrust reverser of the right engine since 13 July. The flaw had been 
detected by the aircraft’s own electronic checking system, but the plane continued to fly in the 
following days, with the right thrust reverser deactivated, in compliance with a suggestion from 
the manufacturer (ANAC, 2009; CENIPA, 2009; Sant’Anna, 2011).  
 
4.3 Crises due to the Socio-Technical System 
Case 1 – It was observed in this case that several warning signs were not interpreted in time. 
Disasters tend to occur when the symptoms of failures and errors are ignored (Turner, 1978). 
Therefore, disasters may have an incubation period during which errors go unnoticed. At this 
time, warning signs may be dismissed as casual incidents or until they reach irreversible scales. 
In Case 1, the signs were appearing in the Brazilian air traffic control system. 
Air traffic controllers are professionals responsible for the safe, orderly and swift 
guidance of aircraft in transit at the country’s airports. They communicate directly with pilots 
to provide them with the information and instructions necessary for each aircraft to complete 
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its flight and prevent crashes and other incidents. However, while air traffic control activities 
were executed without major incidents, flaws in the system itself were ignored and latency 
developed, culminating in the disaster between the Boeing 737 and the Legacy in 2006. 
(ANAC, 2008; Sant’Anna, 2011). The increasing flight traffic at the major airports was 
resulting in extremely stressful psychological and technical demands. The long workdays, low 
pay and precarious equipment were fueling great discomfort among the flight operators. 
 
Case 2 - Two weeks before the disaster, the new runway at Congonhas airport was reopened 
following a major and expensive reform to make it a safer airport. Despite the reform, the pilots 
claimed that there were problems because it was reopened without grooving strips, which give 
planes a better grip on the runway. 
On the day before the disaster, another plane had skidded at the same place, leading to 
the closure of the airport. A few minutes before the disaster, Infraero was asked to measure the 
layer of water on the runway to evaluate the need to suspend landings and departures. The 
measurement was made, but operations were not suspended. The same plane, on the previous 
day, had also experienced difficulty landing, with the plane coming to a complete halt only a 
few meters away from the end of the runway. The media pointed out that the defect in the thrust 




5.1 Reliability in Crisis Situations 
High-Reliability in complex organizations has been explored, particularly in hazardous systems 
like nuclear plants, commercial air transportation and air traffic control (Pidgeon and O’Leary, 
2000; Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002; Roberts, 2011; Catino and Patriotta, 2013). Despite 
awareness of vulnerability to failures and disasters, these conditions are not automatically 
considered as learning when it comes to avoiding catastrophes (Wisner et al., 2012). 
The complexity of the scenarios of flight disasters is directly affected by social and 
technical aspects (Vaughan, 1999). Regarding the social aspects, a relevant point for 
consideration is the importance given to so-called “non-accidents”. Organizational policy 
should incorporate means to promote, both formally and informally, forms of reporting that can 
help prevent further disasters. Moreover, the lack of a consolidated communication system 
could be a potential incubator for disasters (Turner, 1994; Netten and Van Someren, 2011). In 
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terms of technical elements aircraft have black boxes, which can record dialogue between the 
pilots, serving as a primary source of evidence in cases of disasters. 
In the two cases, there was a certain “incredulity” regarding the possibility of a disaster 
occurring, promoted perhaps by the sequence of time free of risks. Examples of this were found 
in the first case, when the pilots of the Legacy jet followed their protocols of knowledge of the 
new aircraft and did not delay or postpone their flight to obtain full knowledge of its technical 
functions. Likewise, the flight controllers had the opportunity to report the corrected altitude of 
the Legacy flight while the signal was being transmitted. They also did not make contact to find 
out the reason for the disappearance of the flight’s data, which is a standard procedure 
established by ANAC. In addition, in Case 2, high-reliability protocols were breached when 
warnings about wet runway closure were ignored for fear of loss of efficiency at the expense of 
reliability. In this context, a model is proposed that demonstrates multi-facets of crisis 
management in HRO, as a complex system, presented in Figure 5. 
 
[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
 
The internal arrows demonstrate the pressure that HRO undergo to maintain reliability. 
These pressures are represented by unexpected events, failures and errors (socio-technical 
system), crisis situations and unpredictable actions. However, the aspects that permeate an HRO 
are represented by the larger outer arrows, which flow from within the organization. These 
aspects are culture of reliability, redundancy and responsibility. These elements promote 
effective crisis management, from human to technical elements, in this type of complex system 
such as civil aviation. 
However, theories such as High Reliability Theory (HRT) demonstrate that preventive 
attitudes can be effective in containing errors and failures. This leads to benefits of 
organizational learning, which are not easy to achieve. Disasters result from the very nature of 
complex and tightly coupled systems. In such a context, there is always the risk of individual 
misconduct before normal or emergent situations result in disasters (Roberts, Bea and Bartles, 
2001). Cases such as the Bhopal Disaster (1984), the Tenerife Air Disaster (1977), the Space 
Shuttle Columbia Disaster (2003), and the Air France Disaster (2009) are classic examples of 
problems in complex systems that occurred due to a combination of human errors, technical 
failures, unstable environment, and negligence, all of which contributed greatly to the disasters. 
Complex systems like civil aviation operate based on a multi-faceted dynamic process 
involving cognitive, emotional, technical, social and political dimensions that impact the 
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behavior of these systems and their parts. Managing them requires a huge effort to combine all 
dimensions and put in place strategies and procedures to achieve greater reliability in complex 
organizations such as airlines and flight control systems. 
 
5.2 Lessons for crisis management in HRO 
What can be learned from flight disasters that will aid crisis management? This question moves 
us as individuals and affects organizations and the civil aviation system because different 
emotional factors come into play at these times, affecting rationality. The simple fact of creating 
a space to reflect on a major tragedy encourages us to learn naturally and spontaneously. In 
both cases, it is important to note how quickly the events occurred that culminated in losing 
control of the situation (Oliver et al., 2017). In the two cases, after the initial incident, little 
could be done for the aircrafts to remain stable. Human and technical factors, in a tightly 
coupled system, caused significant interference that led the entire complex system to destabilize 
(Perrow, 1999). 
The cases in question revealed that civil aviation is a vulnerable system. Due to the 
nature of its operations, it is a highly sensitive system to unexpected events, surprises and 
human errors. The main lesson from Case 1 (Gol/Legacy disaster) indicated that human errors 
in the air control system (CINDACTA) were critical, contributing to the accident as was 
revealed by the formal investigation (CENIPA). The incorporation of a culture focusing on high 
sensitivity to operations coping with expectations and mindfulness would contribute to a greater 
reliability of the traffic control system. 
In Case 2 (TAM disaster), two critical problems were identified: the conditions of the 
runway at Congonhas airport and the lack of experience of the pilots, who did not handle the 
position of the levers correctly (CENIPA). The problem of the runway was essentially a 
responsibility of Infraero, which did not meet the requirement of CENIPA to close the airport 
on days of heavy rain. In the second, case a decision was made by ANAC to require only 
experienced pilots to land and take off at the airport. 
Poor handling of technical equipment, combined with the failures of the flight operators 
and other Brazilian air navigation agents, in both cases, aggravated the errors to the point of 
irreversibility. Therefore, for the management of complex systems, attention to failures is the 
main lesson to be learned. This is why human, technical and managerial elements to create a 
culture of reliability were highlighted. As a result, the main lessons learned for crisis 




[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
In a socio-technical system, an individual component could be involved at every level 
of a disaster. Consequently, not only can the mind of an individual involved in high-risk 
environments cause disasters, but can also prevent or mitigate them (Weick, 1988). In Case 1, 
reports claimed that after the collision there was no possibility for Gol Flight 1907 to correct 
the errors before it fell. In Case 2, however, there was a period of 30 seconds between the 
perception that something was wrong and the crash. Therefore, there is evidence of how a 
tightly coupled system triggers a sequence of failures in a short space of time, making it difficult 
or impossible to correct errors. Therefore, how do errors and disasters occur? Indeed, human 
actions are intended to reduce errors, but there is no evidence or guarantee that these errors will 
be entirely eliminated. Therefore, the most important and best action that individuals can take 
is to try to understand the origin of these failures and contain them (Weick, 1988). 
Redundancies for the high-reliability mechanisms are important in disaster prevention. 
However, the redundancy itself can increase the complexity of the context (Rijpma, 1997). 
Nevertheless, the challenge of learning from failures is not as simple and straightforward as 
some analyses may indicate (Madsen and Desai, 2010). It can be inferred that a culture of 
reliability sometimes exists, but negligent management heightens the possibility of disasters 
occurring. Especially with regard to Case 2, the managerial practices of the airline and 
deficiencies in the airport infrastructure contributed to the resulting disaster. In this case, the 
airline publicly sought economic efficiency in terms of excess aircraft fuel, in spite of high-
reliability protocols. Likewise, the airport infrastructure was negligent concerning the signs of 
error. It had been advised to close the airport under its existing conditions but did not comply 
with the reliability regulations (ANAC, 2009). 
However, how can events like this be avoided? Can any lessons be learned from this 
disaster? The answer lies in the question. The desire to seek information and knowledge 
regarding disasters is a form of avoiding greater misfortunes. The dissemination of management 
focused on high reliability is indispensable in complex systems. This implies going beyond the 
prescriptive aspects of the theories. It means practicing a culture in which aspects relevant to 
operations and human behavior that affect organizational performance are systematically 
observed and monitored to reduce the risk of errors and disasters (Muro and Meyer, 2011). 
The occurrence of both disasters analyzed in this paper led to lessons learned and 
corrective actions. First, following the events of Case 1, ANAC had to improve its air traffic 
control and regulations for critical conditions, as well as respond to the latency that was ignored 
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for a long period of time. Following the events of Case 2, the airline had to improve its failure 
detection mechanisms and review its fuel policy. Furthermore, Infraero put a structural 
reinforcement in place on the runway of Congonhas airport.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Well-known cases like the Bhopal Disaster (1984), the Tenerife Air Disaster (1977), the Space 
Shuttle Columbia Disaster (2003), and the Air France Disaster (2009) are classic examples of 
a combination of human errors and technical failures. There is a tendency to avoid potential 
individual culpability by classifying hazardous situations as technically correct and covering 
up human errors (Tamuz, 2001). By covering up their own errors, managers of complex systems 
tend to attribute them to the complexity of the system. 
In this paper, the two most critical Brazilian aviation disasters were analyzed and 
discussed. This study contributed to a wider debate on crisis management in the context of 
HRO, which despite being a highly regulated and formalized sector is always subject to errors 
(Vaughan, 1999). The errors that led to the disasters in question served as lessons for individuals 
and organizations operating in a complex system. Managerial and operational activities were 
intended to maintain the necessary conditions that prioritize a high level of responsibility and 
redundancy. This involves concern over flaws, reluctance to accept simplified interpretations, 
sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience and detailed specifications of the structure. 
The creation of a culture of reliability in a complex system acts as a way of learning 
from such errors at the individual, organizational and social levels. It is important not only to 
the aviation system but also to society. Likewise, it is necessary to review the public policy that 
regulates the sector and for the agency responsible for supervising policy in that field to renew 
its technology to make this complex civil aviation system more reliable. 
Unpredictable or unexpected events will occur and risks will exist. The aviation system, 
as a complex system, needs to continuously improve its hazardous operations and crisis 
management in order to make the system more reliable. A critical question remains that 
continues to challenge the management of complex systems: “How safe is safe enough?” 
(Douglas, 1992: 41). It should be noted that the increasing vulnerability of a system, associated 
with a sequence of failures and partial understanding of other events, increases the chances of 
an imminent disaster (Wisner et al., 2012). Even though organizational management focuses 
on preventing disasters, an environment prone to disasters can be created imperceptibly, in 
which minor failures can instigate something much larger and disastrous. 
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This study paves the way for future research with the approach of high reliability theory 
applied in different contexts. In addition, elaborating on the existing conditions of 
interconnections among the agents who make up the civil aviation system with a focus on levels 
of autonomy and interdependency to think and act in the system could be a fertile field of 
research. Another relevant approach would be to examine paradoxes, conflicts and tensions 
within and between organizations, and particularly how such elements are undermining control 
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Figure 1 – Coding Case Study approach 
 























































Figure 2 – Types of crisis 
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Figure 3 – Ministry of Defense Structure 
 




































Figure 4 – Brazil map with flight routes 
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Figure 5 - Multi-facets of Crisis Management in HRO 
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Table 1 - Flight Disasters in Brazilian territory 
Characteristics 
Case 1 Case 2 
Gol and Legacy TAM 3054 
When September, 2006 July, 2007 
Location Brazil Northwest Southeast Brazil  
Accident Midair collision Crash on land 
Victims 154 deaths 199 deaths 
Human Failures 
Communication failure between 
air traffic control tower and pilots 
Failed operation of the 
aircraft’s braking system 
Technical Failures Inoperative TCAS Jammed thrust reverser 
Organizational 
Management 
Latent errors: Historical dispute 
between flight controllers 
Latent errors: Previously 
reported reverser failure. 
Reliability: 
technical and social 
Reliability: 
technical and social 





































Table 2 – Lessons from flight disasters 
Lessons from flight disasters 
Human Errors Technical Failures 
- Critical times oblige individuals to make immediate 
decisions increasing the possibility of errors. 
- "Mental rest” of operators is an automatic action to the 
point of comfort leading to errors and failures. 
- “Mental habits” to guide human interpretations and 
behaviors limit the learning of better practices. 
- Traditional habits for a pilot when handling an aircraft 
become routine practices and automatic activities. 
- Barrier is created when focus on the accident is shifted 
to political organizations and system limits learning. 
- Organizations tend to rely on cognitive structures and 
on standard operating procedures (SOPs). This can limit 
the sensitive ability of operators when improvements or 
further learning are sought. 
- Latent errors are caused by a poor interpretation that 
results in disaster. 
-The anti-collision mechanism (TCAS) of the 
Legacy jet was wrongfully disconnected, making it 
impossible for it to function hindering the 
identification of the plane. 
- The mechanism of redundancy projected for 
landing consisted of an aural and visual warning 
regarding faults in the process. However, this 
mechanism offered no possibility for “containing” 
failures. 
- The conditions of the runway at Congonhas 
airport and the lack of experience of pilots handling 
wrongly the position of the levers (CENIPA).  
- The problem of the runway was essentially a 
responsibility of Infraero which did not meet the 
requirement of CNIPA to close the airport due 
heavy rainy days. 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
